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INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia a crowd of
workingmen gathered at the Nevsky Prospect, in the Palace Square,
and on the other avenues of St. Petersburg.

This crowd, led by

Father George Gapon, was on a mission to talk to the Czar —
"Little Father” —

their

because their factory employers had refused to

take any action respecting their grievances.

They were greatly

agitated because four workmen had been dismissed at the great
Putiloff factory and because their requests for an eight hour day,
higher pay, better sanitary conditions, and the right to elect
arbitration committees, had been refused.
their employers did not take action.

They had struck; but

Father Gapon, the founder of

the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, had
convinced them that they might plead their case before the AllHighest, the Czar.

They had a petition addressed to their

sovereign; they were asking for protection from being treated like
slaves.

They had reached a point where "death'was to be preferred

to a continuation of (theirj intolerable sufferings."
men, their wives and children bore no arms —
their ruler.
and death.

What did they receive in return?

These work

only this plea to
Bullets, swords,

Ironically, the Czar was not even in the Winter Palace.

A shot fired accidentally from one of the saluting guns near him
while he was blessing the waters of the Neva on January 19th, was
interpreted by the

Czar as an attempt on his life.
iii

Consequently,

he had fled St. Petersburg.

In the Czar's absence, Grand Duke

Vlaaimer took it upon himself to order the strikers shot down.
Hundreds or thousands of persons were reportedly killed.
Why did this riot take place?
sons.

There were complicated rea

How did the United States and Americans react to this

massacre?

They reacted in different ways.

The purpose of this

paper is to give a brief account of what stimulated the demonstra
tion, explain the role of Father Gapon, discuss the lack of official
reaction on the part of the United States government, and finally,
analyze the reaction of the American public to this "Bloody Sunday"
j

as speni through selected newspaper and periodical accounts of the

iv

CHAPTER I

CLIMATE OP THE STRIKE
When discussing the “Bloody Sunday" of 1905 in
St. Petersburg, Russia, it is necessary to look into the factors
!

which helped to create a climate in which such an outrage could
occur•
At the beginning of the twentieth century, more legal power
was concentrated in the hands of the ruler of Russia than in
'
i !
!

thosjs 6f any other person on earth.

The ruling Czar was

Nicholas II? coming to power in 189^5 he had unlimited sovereign
ty over some 135 million subjects living in an area that included
over a seventh of the earth's surface.*

Historians consider

Nicholas II to be one of Russia's worst rulers.

Though staunchly

autocratic, he had little ability or inclination to rule.

His

reign saw great expansion of industry which led to growth of
organized opposition to the government, both among moderate
liberals and radical revolutionaries.

During his reign, there

was also a great increase in peasant and worker unrest.
I

■

!Liberal opposition groups began to develop in the late
i

nineteenth century.

Heading this movement were the zemstov

organizations which consisted mainly of professional men such as
’1
1 Sidney Harcave, First Blood a The Russian Revolution of 190 5
(New York1 The Macmillan Company, 196k ) , p. 69I (Hereinafter
referred to as First Blood.)

2

doctors and teachers. ' The revolutionary movement, held in check
by Alexander III, began to grow in the 1890*s.

The workers*

unrest and dissatisfaction began to increase under the harsh
conditions of an intensified industrial program of the late l890*s
and early 1900*s.

Peasant unrest also continued to grow during

this time.
The appeal of Marxism began to make headway in Russia in
the I890*s, especially among university students, as Russia
became more industrialized.
this period.

Various kinds of Marxism arose during

The Legal Marxism group followed the lead of the

German Marxist-Revisionist, Bernstein.

He asserted that the

violent revolutionary upheaval forecast by Marx would not occur,
and that Marxists should concentrate their efforts on encouraging
reforms rather than revolution.

The Economism group was s im ilar

to the Legal Marxists but was more practically oriented.

They

advocated working in terms of better work conditions, higher wages
and worker benefits.
The theories of the Legal Marxists and the program of the
Economists were denounced by the politically-minded Marxists led
by the founder of the Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, and by Lenin, the
future Bolshevik leader.

These political Marxists believed their

task was to work for revolution, and scorned reform as helpful to
the government.

A Congress was held at Minsk in 1898 but the

participants were arrested.

A second Congress was held in 1903*

At this Congress the Marxists established the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party.

During the second Congress in 1903 the

3

Social Democrats split into two factions— the Bolsheviks (the
majority) and the Mensheviks (the minority)•

These factions came

to be created by the split in the vote on the issue of Party
organization.

Lenin’s group outnumbered the group led by

Martov and thus Lenin named his group the Bolsheviks.

At times,

the Mensheviks outnumbered the Bolsheviks— despite the names.
The Mensheviks differed from the Bolsheviks in a number of
ways.

They felt all sympathizers should be admitted to their

party whereas the Bolsheviks said that only a tightly-knit group
of professional revolutionaries could belong.

In contrast to a

Menshevik view that discussion and leadership of the party should
be shared, the Bolsheviks believed that party leadership must be
by the elite few whose authority must be absolute and unquestion
ed.

On the one hand Mensheviks envisioned a bourgeois revolution

followed by a long bourgeois democracy and then a socialist
revolution.

On the other hand, the Bolsheviks saw a bourgeois

revolution followed by a dictatorship of the peasants and
proletariat.

Finally, the Mensheviks shunned the peasantry and

allied with the middle classes and liberal bourgeosie to over
throw the autocracy.

But the Bolsheviks scorned the liberal and

middle^class groups to ally itself solely with the peasantry.
The Socialist Revolutionaries also formed a party in the
1900*s.

Like the Bolsheviks, they believed the key to revolution

lay in the peasantry.

They renewed political terror and carried

out a number of assassinations of public officials in the early

1900*s.
In addition to the rise of political awareness, the 1890’s

4

and 1900's saw serious strikes in the cities which arose out of
the total lack of personal freedom in Russia.

S i d n e y Harcave

r

discusses this lack of freedom in his book First Blood:
Extensive authority was delegated to the governors.general, governors, and prefects, each of whom was
appointed by the tsar and required to report to the
minister of interior. . . . These officials exercised
arbitrary power when the tsar, using the authority
decreed by the Law on Exceptional Measures, of 1881,
placed a city, province, or district under "reinforced
protection," which gave its administrator limited emergency
power to deal with any condition or situation that he
considered a threat to law and order; or under "extra
ordinary protedtion," which extended the administrator's
emergency power to include the right on his own authority to
banish persons from the area, to close newspapers and fac
tories, to arrest and fine individuals, and prohibit any
kind of"private gathering. By the beginning of 1904, more
than half of Russia, including most of her major cities,
was under some form of "protection". . . .
Nowhere in Europe were the police as numerous, as
venal, or as powerful as those of Russia. Most un
restricted in., their authority were the political
police. . . .V
In addition to dissatisfaction over the total absence of
political or personal freedom, and growing concern over poor
working conditions, the embarrassment over the war with Japan in
the 1900's added to the turmoil of unrest growing in Russia.
The initial reverses in the Japanese War produced deep mortifica
tion in Russia.

The Russian conduct of the war was more

humiliating than the Japanese victories.

The systematic mis-

representations of the officialrtelegrams only exaggerated the
i

effect of the private news; the Viceroy Alexeyeff was deeply
mistrusted.

The few good officers showed by comparison the

^Harcave, First Blood, p. 15.

5

incompetence of the other officers of all ranks.

Embezzlement

was common, even goods sent to the Red Cross were sold in Moscow.
The Petropovlovsk was sunk outside Port Arthur and the disastrous
battle of Liaoyang followed .close upon it.

Plehve, the Minister

of the Interior, was hated and was assassinated on July 2 8 , 190^.
\

After Plehve*s death came the appointment of Svyatopolk-

Mirsky.

At first he was well-received, and a time of relief

resulted.

^Liberators and Zemstov organizations were busy.

Too

busy, evidently, for a crack-down ensued and repression reigned
once again.

Meanwhile the reverses in the war continued.

Raising recruits and sending off reservists sometimes led to
serious disorders.

To combat such disorders, meetings were for

bidden and officials who took part in them were subjected to
special punishment.

The Zemstva were not to discuss questions

outside their competence; the Press was ordered to write articles
intended to calm the populace.
censorship.

Other newspapers suffered from

On January 19» at a religious ceremony in

St. Petersburg, an accidental shot from a saluting battery
threatened danger to the life of the Emperor, who fled the
capital, not to return for more than a year.1

It was at this

point that the workmen actively entered into the protest movement.

M i c h a e l T. Florinsky, Encyclopedia of Russia and the
Soviet Union. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.', 1961),
pp. 3^6-350. Most of the information in this chapter was gained
from this source.

CHAPTER II
BLOODY SUNDAY
The revolutionary movement in Russia, held In check during
the reign of Alexander III, revived and grew In the 1890's.
Liberal Opposition grew until serious strikes occurred in the
early 1900's.

The Russo-Japanese war aroused general hostility

toward the regime of Nicholas II and the workingmen of Russia
were restless and discontented; the industrial expansion of
Russia had created harsh conditions for the working population.
Into this atmosphere of unrest and discontent in St. Petersburg
walked Father Gapon--a handsome, bearded man, with a rich voice
that spell-bound the people.

He appealed to the workingman be

cause he stood close to them; he was born a peasant in 1870 and
was deeply interested in the conditions of labor, sympathetically
affected by the injustices he saw, and sincerely dedicated to
their correction,
workers.

As such he was accepted by the St. Petersburg

Because he seemed interested in the people and not

revolutionary, Gapon was encouraged by the government to form the
Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg.
1

He opened

the union In April of 190^.
Its aims, inter alia, were to affirm 'national conscious
ness* amongst the workers, develop 'sensible views'
regarding their rights and foster amongst the members of
the Assembly 'activity facilitating the legal improvements

6

of the workers' conditions of work and living.'"!
The groups of the society could set up their own tea rooms and
stores; they could set up mutual-aid funds, go to concerts and
lectures; and even have legally approved chances for discussing
their needs and legitimate grievances.

These sanctioned

assemblages gave the workers opportunity to communicate with
different labor groups and the spirit to cry out against injustices
Thus, the growth of the union backfired on the officials as the
union ". . . developed into a 'cross between a trade union, a
mutual aid society and even an underground revolutionary organization;'. . . . "

By the end of 190^ the Assembly had a mem

bership divided into eleven sections with cells in most of the
larger factories, including a particularly strong contingent at
the Putilov works:
. . . the strength of the Assembly and of its sympa
thizers exceeded by far that of the political parties.
In St. Petersburg at this time, for example, the local
Menshevik and Bolshevik committees could muster no more
than three hundred members each. This disparity accounts
. no doubt for the interest that Liberals, Social-Democrats
and Socialist-Revolutionaries all took in Gapon's
Assembly.3
The growth of the society was relatively slow initially,
but as the workers became more and more disenchanted and dis^■Lionel Kochan, Russia in Revolution 1890-1918 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
1966), pp. 7^-75.
(Hereafter
referred to as Kochan, Russia in R e v .)
2Ibld.
3Ibid.
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gruntled they increasingly joined the Assembly to have the
opportunity to air their concerns and complaints.

They began to

feel that those who ruled Russia were inefficient and corruptj
consequently, there were many strikes and mass demonstrations
from 1900-1905 and after.

Their main objectives were economic;

but local Social-Democratic committees were very active in put-'
•

j

ting forth political demands.
The workers were not only disgusted and dissatisfied with
their employers and their working conditions, they were also
disenchanted with the Russo-Japanese war.

The news from the

front seemed to reinforce the antigovernment propaganda published
by the socialists.

"The shock of Russia's ignominious defeat in

the Japanese war accelerated the pace of the reform and the
revolutionary movements which had been gathering strength for a
decade, culminating in the violent outbreak known as the
revolution of 1905•*

1

This climate of discontent was destined to worsen and
eventually build into an outburst.

Gapon foresaw that Russian

society was undergoing many stresses.

He predicted that a crisis

would occur if the bureaucracy did not begin to listen to the
grievances of the common man.
came at the end of 1904.

The crisis foreseen by Gapon

The agitation among the professional

men was beginning to communicate itself to the masses.

The

initial spark was the dismissal of four Putilov workmen named
^Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire (New Haven 1
Yale University Press, 1931)# P« 11^8. (Hereinafter referred to
as Florinsky, End Russian Empire)

9

Federov, Sergunin, Subbotin, and Ukaiov at the end of December.
These men were all members of the Assembly with many years of
employment in the Putilov factory.

Gapon assumed that their

membership was the reason for their dismissal.

In order to save

credibility for the Assembly, Gapon tried to intercede for the
dismissed men with the Putilov management, the local factory
inspector and the governor-general of St. Petersburg.

On behalf

of the union and the dismissed men, Gapon demanded two things:
reinstatement of the four workers; and removal of foreman
Tetyankin whom the workers blamed for their dismissal.
The plant manager Smirnov insisted that there were no
grounds for grievances.

He maintained that only Sergunin had

been dismissed for faulty work and that Subbotin had left of his
own accord.

Ukaiov was to have been dismissed for unauthorized

absence but as he had promised to reform, he was still employed;
Federov was also still employed.

In any case, Smirnov refused to

cooperate with Gapon because he stated that the Assembly of
St. Petersburg Factory Workers was not authorized to negotiate
with him.

Rejecting Smirnov's statement, Gapon organized a strike

movement at the Putilov works in order to create additional
pressure on the management.
He had the faithful following, the ability to contrive
and execute, and the self-confidence necessary for the
role. Assuredly it was he who prompted the initial move
of the Putilovites which led directly to the Assembly's
taking on the implicit character of a labor union and to

^George A. Gapon, The Story of My Life (London:
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1905)» PP* 1^2-1^3.
(Hereinafter
referred to as Gapon, Story o f .)
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its transformation into a quasi-revolutionary body.1
By January3,' 1905 'all the thirteen thousand Putilov workers were
o n ostrike.

Soon the only occupants of the factory were the two

agents of the secret police.

Though some historians claim that

Gapon was a secret government agent, the fact is that he eschewed
his duty as a priest and as an agent of the government when he
did not stop the strike.

Also, he took leadership of the strike

and turned a limited, plant-wide strike with no economic demands
i

into one that not only made economic demands but also provided
1

;

the jimpetus
I (Japon

for a general strike.
and the strikers broadened

to includei

the demands ofthe workers

1. an eight hour day; 2. increased daily wage from

60 Kopecks to 100 Kopecks for men;

3« increased wage from kO

Kopecks to 75 Kopecks for women;
5. provision for free medical aid;
constituent assembly;

improved sanitary facilities;
6, immediate convocation of a

7. establishment of personal liberties;

\

8. an| end to the war with Japan; and 9« amnesty for political
exiles.

As the strike lengthened, the strikers' demands became

more extensivei

MLet all be free and equal.

And to this end let

the election of the members to the Constituent Assembly take
place in conditions of universal, secret and equal suffrage.**2
j The workers made further political and economic demandsi
1. universal and compulsary education;
I

2. freedom of the press;

'

3# separation of church and state;

4. replacement of indirect

^Harcave, First Blood, p. 73.
p

Kochan, Rev, in Russia, p. 76 •
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taxation with progressive income tax;
law;

5* equality before the

6. transfer of land to the people; and ?. abolition

factory inspectors to end oppression.
desperation, the strikers felt:

Pushed to a point of

"There are only two paths for us;

either freedom and happiness, or the grave.
sacrifice to agonizing Russia.

Let our life be a

We will not grudge this sacrifice,

we gladly give it..”^
The strike steadily increased and spread.

By the middle of

the week of January 3rd some 25»000 workers all over St. Peters
burg were on strike--all making practically the same demands as
the Putilov workers..
!At first the strike aroused little outside concern.

The

Minister*of Interior, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, was seemingly unconcerned.

i

The Minister of Finance. Kakovtsev, who controlled the factory

i
inspection system and received reports of the workers' doings,
apparently saw no reason for alarm, but he did report the strike
t

to. the\ Czar.

The minister pointed out the illegality of the

strike, , He did not express any anticipation of serious diffi
culties in righting matters.

Thus informed, the Czar did not

react very forcefully:
"A clear, frosty day," the tsar wrote in his diary entry
for 8 January.
"There was much activity and many reports.
went for a long walk.
Since yesterday all the factories
and shops in St. Petersburg have been on strike. Troops
have been brought in from surroundings to strengthen the
garrison. The workers have conducted themselves calmly
hitherto.
Their number is estimated at 120,000. At
the head of the workers' union some priest-— socialist
Gapon. Mirsky came in the evening with a report of the

-^Kochan, Russia in Rev., p. 78*

. .
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measures taken."
Others of the bureaucracy were slow in recognizing the
potential threat of the strike movement as it picked up momentum.
Harcave described the situation*
St. Petersburg Prefect Fullon and the police seemed to be
guided by the assurance that Gapon*s leadership v/as to be
trusted as the surest means of handling the strikers.
They had become convinced that he alone could keep the
discontented workers of the Assembly from going over to the
revolutionaries. And even after the strike began to spread
and it became evident that Gapon was set on his maverick
course, ignoring his superiors in both church and govern
ment and actually promoting the strike movement, General
Fullon held to a laissez-faire policy toward him, fearing
that opposition or restraint might drive him to release
his followers to the revolutionary camp and thus confront
the police with a force they would be unable to handle..
Meanwhile, Gapon had been scurrying back and forth among
worker groups encouraging and rousing the strikers.

He carried

with him the petition which set forth their appeals, encouraging
the workers to sign it and present it as a direct appeal to the
Czar.^

The strikers were busy themselves encouraging the other

workers to join in the fraternity of strikers.
methods of the strikers were very effective.

The promotional
By January 7# the

industrial life of St. Petersburg was almost immobilized.
but 25*000 of the city*s 1?5»000 workers were out.

All

These strikers

were becoming convinced that they should appeal to their Czar for
justice.
1 Ibid., p. 79

2
Harcave, First Blood, p. 77 .
See Appendix A.
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Gapon and his lieutenants were accomplishing the final

touches on the plan to have tens of thousands o f St. Petersburg
workers and their'families participate in a march.

The workers

felt that the march would make their dream come true? that is,
their “Little Father * would accept their humble requests in his
all-knowing justice.

These simple workers did not fully under

stand the implications of the requests as presented in Gapon's

i
petition.

Harcave points out this naivete on the part of the

worker^i
j

'

.

.

.

That most of the strikers had any clear understanding of
the petition that they were preparing to present or that
they ever consciously aspired to the political changes
requested in it is most doubtful. They were discontented,
to be sure, and bound by conditions that promoted despera
tion, as the rapid spread ofthe strike showedj but, for
the| most part, they still shared the average Russian
wjorker's unconcern with political aims and were, in fact,
generally antipathetic to political discussions. Their
signing the document was, for the majority of them, only
a manifestation of faith in their revered leader. • • •
However, to say that Gapon was taking advantage of his
followers' credulity and loyalty by promoting a liberal
program disguised in monarchical terms, assuredly
acceptable to them, would beunfair. As far as can be
jiidged, he saw no illogic inthe scheme he proposed.
He
apparently believed sincerely that, • . ., he himself
could use his influence to guide the present Romanov.1
By January 7$ the officials finally became aware that
action was no longer avoidable.

The Minister of Interior

Svyatopolk-Mirsky and chief of St. Petersburg Prefect Fullon
i

ordered troops. They still did not inform the Czar of any
i
serious troublet nor did they try to deal with the source of the

. 1
potential trouble or try to check its development.
^Harcave, First Blood, p. 82.

When Gapon

Ik

Informed the government of the impending march of the workers
and their families on January 8 , he underlined the peaceful
nature of the march and asked that the Czar receive him at the
Winter Palace so that he could present the workers* petition*
Gapon sent a message stating that*
Say to the emperor that I, together with thousands of
people of Russia, am irrevocably resolved to proceed to
the Winter palace at lio'clock p.m. Sunday, January 22,
in order that he may show his faith by deeds and not by
manifestos. Let him come as the true emperor to his
people to receive our petition. Otherwise the moral
^
bound between the emperor and the people may be broken.
Even then, the Czar was not told of the march nor that his
presence had been requested.
by Svyatopolk-Mirsky.

Instead, Gapon*s arrest was ordered

Prefect Fullon did not carry out the

arrest, fearing a greater turmoil if Gapon were apprehended.
Instead the officials prepared to meet an illegal march with
forcei
After the event, it seemed that the tactics they agreed
upon were those that would result in the greatest shedding
of blood and therefore, presumably, Insure the most lasting
intimidation. • . • They made no adequate effort to reach
the workers* leaders, to demand that the instructions for
march^be rescinded, or to check in any other way the
anticipated action before it should require forcible re
straint.2
The workers did not expect any violence.

It was unthink

able to them that the Czar would use force against his subjects
while they were in the act of presenting a humble petition to him.
*Sunday World Herald. Omaha, Nebraska, January 22, 1905,
front page.

2

Harcave, First Blood, p. 85 .

The resulting massacre was therefore all the more shocking.^
”No figures give the precise numbers of killed and wounded.
2
There may well have been more than a thousand.”
Though the
figures vary, the fact remains that this bloody deed was horrible
in the eyes of the world.

'1

j The massacre is more completely described in Chapter III.
2
,Kochan, Rev, in Russia, p. 78 .

CHAPTER III.
FATHER GAPON
When Bloody Sunday is considered in any frame of reference,
it is necessary to consider what kind of man Father George Gapon
was, what role he played in the massacre, and what effect he had
on Americans.
Father Gapon was born in 1870 in a small town called Biliki
in the province of Poltava in South Russia.^

Born of peasant

parents, Gapon was nevertheless destined for world-wide notoriety.
His parents were encouraged to allow their son George to go to
school beyond the normal levels expected of boys who worked as
shepherds.

After completing the local village school, Gapon was

sent by his parents to the Poltava Ecclesiastical Seminary.
During his time

at thePoltava Seminary, Gapon tutored

priests1 children andsaw ” . . .
them.

that there was much

Parisaism among

Not only did they not sacrifice their own comfort for the weal

of the people, but they were

r>

often positive leeches, . . . . " B e c a u s e

^-Lionel Kochan,
Russia in Revolution 1890-1918 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), p^ 72. In the January 25, 1905
issue of the Times magazine on page two, an article claims he was
born in 1869*
Gapon does not give a date in his autobiography.
One would tend to put greater credence In-Kochan*s datre.
^Father George A. Gapon, The Story of My Life (London:
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1905),
19•
(Hereinafter referred to as
Story o f .

he was disenchanted with the clergy, Gapon ". . .concluded . . .
(he) was xmfit for the priesthood."1

This disenchantment caused

him to drop out of the Poltava Seminary.
This action caused him
i
to be barred from other universities.
He thought that he might
become a medical doctor to satisfy his personal need to help
people.

But before he pursued this new ambition, he met a woman

who convinced him that he could do more for the masses by being in
the priesthood.

In his autobiography he explains:

When I objected that my principles did not coincide with
the teachings of the Orthodox Church, she replied that
that was no sufficient objection; the main thing was to
be true, not to the Orthodox Church, but to Christ, who
was a model of sacrifice for Humanity. As to the symbols
and ritual of the Church, they were symbols and ritual
only.
This convinced me; I determined to become a priest,
and she agreed to marry me. 2
Gapon became a priest and served in Poltava for four years,
during which time he tried to get into the Ecclesiastical Academy
in St. Petersburg.

After much perseverance and frustration, he

got a scholarship to the Academy, but was immediately disappointed
with the caliber of the instruction.

Feeling that all of the

teachers were pedagogic, he became disgusted with the system:
1
Gapon, Story o f , p. 20. The Times article referred to on
the page before, says that he was expelled because he was a
liberal. At any rate, Gapon did drop out of Poltava Ecclesias
tical Seminary.
i

2Ibid., p. 23.

1

Gapon does not give his wife's name in his
autobiography.
Since the book was published in 1905# he may have
been protecting her family. Throughout the account, Gapon rarely
referred to dates. After being married four years, his wife died
leaving him with two children — a boy and a girl. The children
went to his wife's parents after her death. No records which
were consulted mentioned what happened to them.

The clever and. 'earnest (students) felt unable to stand
the strifling CsicQ atmosphere in which the Russian
Church is placed, and by such continuous sifting, few,
except the ignorant, incapable, or depraved, are left
for the Church.^
However, his determination to become an ordained priest enabled
Gapon to complete the program.
After ordination as a priest, Gapon was assigned to the
chaplaincy of the St. Petersburg prison.

He also worked for the

church which was attached to one of two Orphanages of the Blue
Cross in the workmen's quarter.

In addition, Gapon taught the

Bible in the Olga Poor House (which was under the patronage of the
Empress).

On his regular rounds, Gapon passed a place called

Haven Field.

It was an area for "unfortunates" who were outcasts

from their society, and for the poor people of St. Petersburg.
Gapon felt badly about their unhappy existence but he ". . . had
no idea of attempting to assist in the reformation of society."

2

However, the more he learned of the life of the poor people, the
more he began to think of how to help them.
to the Prefect of St. Petersburg —

Consequently, he went

General Kleggells, to ask to

be allowed to set up a program to help these outcasts.

Gapon's

idea was to have labor houses for regeneration of the outcasts.
Outcasts would have to choose a colony to enter, where they would
have to work.

Through work would come their regeneration.

Gapon submitted his idea to the Prefect but it was never pre
sented to the Empress, who was the head of the poor houses.

Gapon, Story o f , p.
2Ibld.. p. 6 3 .
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i

Though Gapon was not able to help the poor in his first
attempt at a formalized program, he did begin to change his view
points on how to help them.
had political ideas.
change was necessary.

He became familiar with workmen who

He did not at that time think that political
He told the workmen that by some industrial

organization they might reach better results for their own eleva
tion than by entbering into conflict with the Government.

However,

the more he became aware of how the Government turned a deaf ear
to the pleas of 'the common man, the more convinced he became that
some steps needed to be taken for or by the workmen.

The workmen

showed him that some political action could !and should be taken.
It was not a case, . . . , of propaganda among the
workmen by an educated person, but rather,: on the
contrary, the workmen who moved me to a perception
of how alone their needs could be satisfied.
I
began to see what a tremendous influence it might be
for the amelioration of the conditions of labor in
Russia if this large body of workmen could be com
bined and taught how to protect their own interests,

r-

During the time he was priest for the church in St. Peters
burg, Gapon also formed an opinion which was to be very important
in a decision he was to make later while working with the
ized workmen.

organ

In St. Petersburg he met Princess Elizabeth

Norishkin, who had been a nursemaid to Czar Nicholas.
Gapon an idealized view of the emperor.
Nicholas was a good, kind,

She gave

She convincedGapon that

honest man, although she did sayhe

unfortunately, very weak-willed and devoid of any strength of
character.

From this, Gapon conceived the notion that Nicholas

iGapon, Story of, p. 77*

was
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was an Ideal Czar who'had not had an opportunity of showing his
real worth.
people.

He felt the Czar was the only salvation of the Russian

Beginning to believe that the day would come when the Czar

would be able to rise to any situation, Gapon developed the belief
that Nicholas would eventually listen to the voices of his people
and would help to create a situation which could make them happy.
Obviously, this concept of the Czar affected Gapon's decision to
appeal to Nicholas during the strike in January of 1905.

Tragi

cally, Gapon*s ill-conceived concept of the Czar was very far
from accurate.
Meanwhile, during the development of a prejudiced notion of
the good-heartedness of Nicholas, Gapon was becoming increasingly
dissatisfied with the governmental attempts to help the disadvan
taged common man.

He openly criticized these attempts and found

himself in his second encounter with the police.
to get him fired.

Anitchkoff tried

He renounced Gapon as a-revolutionist to the

Central Department of the Political Police, but he was cleared by
a police official named Mikhailoff who told Gapon that he was in
sympathy with him and gave a favorable report to the Metropolitan
Chief, Antonius.

Mikhailoff also took Gapon to see M. Sergius

Vasilivitch Zubatoff, the chief of the political section of the
Department of Police.
Zubatoff tried to convince Gapon that his one object in life
was to help the working man.

Saying that he realized Gapon had

this as his aim also, Zubatoff asked Gapon to work with the police
to set up a7workman's society which could be closely guided and
watched by the-government.

Gapon reacted carefully.

He told
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Zubatoff that he didn't want to get involved.
realized what Zubatoff wanted

Slowly Gapon

to organize the factory workers

in an association under the supervision and direction of the
Secret Police.

Gapon began to see the association as a trap

constructed by the police in order to separate the working classes
from the intellectuals and thus kill the political movement.
Zubatoff tried to convince Gapon that the workingmen should
bb organized because they had a Czar who as an autocrat could
play the part of the balance of power between the working men and
the autocracy.. Zubatoff insisted that the Czar had been influi
enced by men in the upper class who were convincing Nicholas to
make policies which were to the benefit of these upper class men.
i *
■
He insisted that the workingmen had an obligation to organize
i
themselves so that they could have enough power to exert an
influence on the Emperor and help him to be more impartial and
make policies more beneficial to the whole nation.
Zubatoff's implication that the Czar was simply misguided
had some effect upon Gapon.

However, he felt that a constitution

al monarchy would be a better answer to setting up a system where
by the interests of all groups ofjthe nation would be considered.
Professing to be a constitutionalist, Zubatoff maintained that the
change could not come about veryisoon.

He objected to the

students and other intellectuals influencing the workmen.

He

wanted a man like Gapon to help organize the workmen because
Gapon would be much more "impartial."
point to Gapon, Zubatoff said:

Trying to explain his
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The intellectual classes are only agitating for their
own political purposes; all they want is to get
political power for themselves, using the workmen
merely as tools, and we must struggle against this
selfishness and this duping of simple people.
Gapon was not convinced that the Revolutionists,

including

intellectuals and students, worked with ulterior motives.
ever, he did not argue with Zubatoff*

How

*'I did not argue any more

for fear of betraying my sympathy with the heroic figures of the
Russian Revolutionary Movement, of whose deeds I had heard much
from my own workmen."^

He was also not convinced yet that he

shojild; work for Zubatoff because he did not trust the man.
In 1903 Gapon decided that the police were trying to divert
the ;pe ople's attention from political ideas and to kill any
1
grovith of a true labor movement.

At that time he decided that he

coul d not in good conscience Join Zubatoff's movement.

Deciding

to be actively against Zubatoff*s plan, Gapon wrote a report
which explained that the plan would demoralize people in the
<

laboi* movement and he advocated instead a free and independent
i

unioh similar to those which were found in England.

After he

sent his report to the police Metropolitan Chief Antonius and to
Kleggells, Zubatoff redoubled his efforts to get Gapon's cooperat ion.
j Gapon went to more meetings with Zubatoff because he was
curibus to see what Zubatoff could do for him.
^Gapon, Story o f , p. 84.
^Ibld., p . 85•

He began to think

that perhaps he could use Zubatoff's cooperation to accomplish
his own desires for the working man.

Gapon felt that the

situation was becoming more miserable for the people under
increasingly oppressive measures of the Government.

Some action

needed to be taken to help the people, and gradually Gapon began
to think that he could pretend to adhere to Zubatoff's policy
while actually working towards his own purpose of setting up a
genuine working-class organization.
Although nothing ever came of Gapon's idea, this incident is
important in that it explains why Gapon ever cooperated with the
police against the people.

However, it is the opinion of this

writer/researcher that Gapon only "used” the police to suit his
own ends —

i.e., helping his fellow man.

At first Gapon felt that he should give up the priesthood to
help the workmen.

Then he decided that he could have a more

effective communication channel to the workmen if he remained a
priest in St, Petersburg.

As a priest, Gapon had the opportunity

of coming into close contact with the workmen.
came to a decision.

Finally Gapon

He developed a plan for influencing the

Workmen's Association organized by Zubatoff in such a way as to
completely paralyze the efforts of the Political Police, to use it
as a buttress of the Autocracy, and to direct it into an alto
gether different channel.

He had no faith left in the genuiness

of Zubatoff's intentions, and had therefore, decided to use the
prefect for his own purposes.
He determined to organize the workers for mutual help under
the protection of the authorities.

But, at the same time he
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would set up secret Societies of hand-picked workmen to educate
as “missionaries” to convert the whole organization to a true
labour movement.

He wanted to groom these men so that they

could replace the police appointed officials of the union.
Realizing that he could and probably would be criticized for his
seeming collaboration with the police, Gapon decided to go ahead
and set up the labour association.
Gapon must have felt that he might be condemned for
cooperating with the police even if to accomplish his own aims,
for in his book Story of My Life he seems compelled to sayi
The reader who is calmly considering this story in
the light of the peaceful and law-abiding feelings of
a citizen of a free land may wonder that I should
have consented any longer to associate myself, even
in so slight a way, with so dubious a venture as this,
now that I began to see its real nature. But, filled
as I was with disgust, the more I saw of Zubatoff*s
movement, the peculiar and desperate character of the
position of the mass of my poor countrymen still more
painfully oppressed me. The very existence of this
movement shows how little Russian conditions can be
judged by Western standards.
In no other civilized
country, I suppose, would it be possible to con
ceive the heads of police, with the patronage and
authority of the most powerful Ministers of the
Sovereign, deliberately undertaking to organize a
labour movement, and even going so far as to organize
strikes, solely with the object of “dishing” the
natural leaders of the working classes, and so keeping
the industrial movement under their own control.
It was clear to me that my countrymen would
never be in better conditions of life until they were
organized; and it appeared to me — and this belief
has been confirmed by what has since happened —
that, whoever commenced that organization, it would
in the end become a genuine labour movement, because
the intelligent members of the working classes who
had been enlisted would ultimately get the upper
hand. That is why, after much anxious thought, I
decided that, distasteful as it might be, I ought to
take part in this beginning and to endeavor, using
Zubatoff as a tool, gradually to get control of the
organization into my own hands. By affecting to help
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these servants'of the Autocracy I should get complete
freedom in my relations with the working men, and I
should not be under the perpetual necessity of hiding
my movements from police spies. ^
In 1903, Zubatoff died leaving Gapon in a somewhat un
certain position with the workers' association.

However, in

August of 1903 five members from a secret committee Gapon had set
up earlier asked Gapon to take full control of the association.
Agreeing readily, Gapon started to organize the men into the
"Gathering of Russian Factory Hands of St. Petersburg.”

He began

to condition the workers to think in terms of how real progress
j

coujld be made toward the improvement of working conditions for the

U
masses.
I

!

j

On April 11, 1904 the opening ceremony of the St. Petersburg

Factjory Workers' Society took place.

Gapon felt that this

occurrence gave him a firm base from which to begin his work.
formed circles to study industrial and political questions.

He
To

listen to Gapon it sounds as if he was a modern-day union presii
'
S
dent jj
j I had often to go to the managers of the factories
and workshops to ask for some improvement in the
conditions of labour, to smooth over some undesirable
conflict, to find work for unemployed hands, or to
get some unfortunate man reinstated.^
In May of 1904 Gapon attempted to organize the thirteen
thousand workers of the Putiloff Works in St. Petersburg.

He sent

i '1

j Gapon, Story o f , p. 102. This long quotation is included
to produce the effect of a voice from the past. This passage seems
to create the feeling that Gapon is talking directly to the reader.
I 2
; Ibid.. pp. 117-118

his trained men among the Putiloff workers to stir up interest in
an organization for the workman.

At the end of May, fifty of the

Putiloff workers asked Gapon to organize a society among them
similar to the St. Petersburg Factory Workers* Society.

Gapon

gave up his chairmanship of the parent organization to become
chairman of the Putiloff association.

By the end of June, 190^

there;were seven hundred members of the new branch.

In June, the

police once again asserted their supposed control over Gapon and
thus over the association.
money for his society.

They offered Gapon a large sum of

Suspecting that the police were attempt-

lngj to implicate him in a collaboration, Gapon took the money and
' 1
entered it into accounts as an' anonymous gift. He took the money
!

'

!

■

■

■

-

■

so tha|t the police would not doubt his sincerity.
I
-Word of the new workers* societies spread in St. Petersburg.
Bequests came to open new branches.
branches had been opened.

By November, 190^ eleven new

By the time of the strike in January

ther'e were twenty thousand members in the society.*
.

One matter

i

which influenced the workmen to join the society was the war in
Manchuria with Japan.

At first the workmen, though not showing

much interest in the Russian campaign, were sympathetic with its
cause.

As the war progressed, the workers* attitudes changed

because of all the abuses, and corruption in the navy and the army.
Reports of defeat of the Russian troops caused the workingmen to
I

oppose the war and added to their distrust of the Czar and his
advisors.
|

i

1

This feeling of the workmen was indicative of the

Gapon, Story o f , p. 130.

2?

growing dissatisfaction among the workmen toward many prevalent
conditions in their society.
Included, in this growing workmen dissatisfaction was
increasing bitterness toward the way they were treated by the
management in the factories.

Gapon saw the role of his society as

a protector of these workmen; he saw the society's role as one of
mediatpr between management and laborers.^

At the end of December,

190^s four workmen were dismissed from the Putilov factory.

Two

j

of the Iworkers had been working at the Putilov factory for twelve
i.

i .

yearls; the other two had been employed for seven years.

The

.society did not feel that there was any justification for the
i
•
dismissal and Gapon suspected they were released simply because
they^belonged to his society of workmen.
At first he thought that the men would be reinstated; but
when they were not, he decided that the society would have to
take action.
s
■
j

j Gapon
to thb Czar.

conceived the idea that the workmen should go directly
The workers, with their wives and children, would

march to the Winter Palace.

There they would plead their cause

and present their grievances to the highest authority.

Gapon1s

mistaken conception of a mis-guided but well-meaning Czar was
the basis of this decision and he convinced the workmen that if
j

they could reach the "Little Father” over the heads .of the police
men, cpfficials, foremen, factory inspectors, governors and
■1
; In his book Sidney Harcave expresses great doubt over Gapon's
sincerity.
He says:
"Of the primary sources, the fullest is Gapon's
The Story of My Life. . . . " Harcave, First Blood:
The Russian
Revolution of 190 5 (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 196^), pT 59*
(Hereinafter referred to as First Blood.)
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factory-owners, the Czar would right the wrongs against the work
men .
.

Gapon, aided by some sympathizers, drew up a petition for
/

presentation to the Czar.
workers'

This document showed the Russian

sense of exclusion from society.^

It complained that

the government had been abused by bureaucracy and was headed into
ruin and maintained that Russia needed popular representation to
save it from catastrophe.
Meanwhile Gapon gave notice of the demonstration to the
minister of the interior, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, and to the Czar.

He

emphasized its peaceful nature and implored the Czar to receive
the petition.

Gapon did not know that the Czar was at his winter

palace with his family.
arrest was ordered.

No response came.

Instead Gapon's

Gapon ignored the warrant,

spending the days

immediately preceding the projected march, haranguing meetings of
the workers.
to them.

He tried to assure them that the Czar would listen

However if he did not, Gapon vowed that in such case,

". . . for us there is no tsar."

He warned that if there was no

reform from the Czar, the state of Russia was at a point where
there would inevitably be a revolution that would last for years
and involve great bloodshed.

I
j
While spending the last night before the march in the French

quarter of the Narvskaya Zastava, Gapon and his followers heard
the disturbing preparations of the soldiers organizing for the

1

See Appendix A for a copy of the petition.

march.

The sinister sound of the soldiers marching with fixed

bayonets and the cossacks passing on horseback contrasted to the
muted praying of the people preparing for the march.

When Gapon

heard the soldiers® preparation, he decided that It would be wise
to give the demonstration a religious tone and therefore, ordered
that icons be carried in the march and religious chants be sung.
;The people were not aware of the dangers which awaited them.
Large posters had invited the workmen to join the procession.
They had hung for two days with no police interference.

People

began to believe that the police were not going to interfere in
'

i

any iway and thus they prepared to come out In great numbers.
i
! ihe day of January 22, 1905 dawned cold and crisp in
i

|

St. Petersburg, Russia. Father George Gapon led the column from
I
Hall in his priest's robes.
Behind him came a crowd of
.

-

i

about twenty thousand people, men and women, young and old.
all marched bareheaded,

They

. . full of the simple intention of

seeing their Sovereign in order, as one of them said, 'to cry out
■! .
2
theirj griefs like children on the breast of their father.'"
:The plan was that all groups would form columns and begin to
march at different times, depending on the distance of their
gathering places.

The hope was that all groups would meet in the

square in front of the Czar's Winter Palace at two o'clock in the
!
'
j'

afterhoon.
i

|These marchers/protestors were met by over twenty thousand
1
See Appendix B for a picture of Gapon.
2

Gapon, Story o f , p. 179.

Cossacks commanded, b y eight major-generals, in addition to the
police detailed for the day's operation.

The crowd was ordered to

clear the way.* After the warnings, the Cossacks marched on the
i
.
2
crowds, slashing as they did so.
The order was then given for the soldiers to open fire.
According to one account, the soldiers gave warning shots, but
when this action did not disperse the crowd, the men fired into
the crowds.
The scene resulting from the execution of that order
was to become etched into the minds of the Russian
people as the one, above all others of this tragic
Sunday, that represented the brutal injustice under
which they lived.
It was to be described over and
over with embellishments and much bitter vindic
tiveness. 3
Gapon fell to the ground to avoid being hit.
the crowd first kneeled and then lay flat.
was apalled by the scene of the massacre.

The rest of

When Gapon got up he
There are various

statements of the number killed; Gapon said that there were
between six hundred and nine hundred killed, and at least five
thousand wounded.

Other accounts claim up to four thousand dead.

After the first of the shooting, Gapon*s friends forced him
to flee from the debacle.

Through a series of exciting events,

he made his escape to Germany and eventually to England.

From

London, Gapon prophesied in his autobiography - the primary source
*Harcave, First Blood, p. 89.
2
There is disagreement between secondary sources and Gapon's
report. Appendix C gives Gapon's account from his book.
3

Ibid., p. 92
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dealing with Bloody Sunday —

that the results of this “Bloody

Sunday" would be a major revolution!
1 may say therefore, with certainty, that the
struggle is quickly approaching its inevitable
climax; that Nicholas IX is preparing for himself
the fate which befell a certain English King and
a certain French King long ago, and that such
members of his dynasty as escape unhurt from the
throes of the revolution may, on some day in the
not very distant future, find themselves exiled
upon some distant shore.
G a pon’s prophesy became eerily accurate as history recorded.
At the time of the massacre, the world could not foresee coming
events,

it could only react with horror and shock to the Bloody

Sunday massacre.

In the United States Gapon was viewed as a

saint and many magazines and newspapers carried accounts describ
ing Gapon and his character.

The New York Times of January 23*

1905 asserts on the front page that Gapon was the fearless leader
of the march and maintains that Gapon master-minded the strike
like a genius.

In the February 16, 1905 issue of the magazine

Independent, Gapon is described as a ".
an " . . . excellent ecclesiastic."

. . remarkable man" and

He is described as a dedicated

priest who devoted his life to helping his fellow man.

Gapon is

lauded as the prime mover of the creation of the "Union of the
Workingmen."

It was Gapon who led the people who " . . .

did not

hesitate to sacrifice themselves in the cause of liberty."

1
Gapon, Story o f . p. 255*

2

Vladimer Bienstock, "Father Gapon," Independent,
February 16, 1905, pp. 351-353.
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The February 4, 1905 Issue of the magazine Outlook compares
Gapon to Tolstoy:
Father Gapon, like Tolstoy, has an indestructible
faith in the moral force of man. . . . Father
Gapon calls men to action, in the name of God
certainly, but always to action, even through the
force of arms. . . .
The political teachings of
Father Gapon, which are strong and clear in
matters of principle and modest as to practical
questions, show us that this man has already
^
reached the threshold of conscious Socialism. . . .
By March of 1905» an author is saying of Gapon that the
people of Russia regard Gapon as a ". . . deliverer half-divine."
The author feels that these people's faith ". . . is ignorance
yearning for a great man, making a God of a simple priest."

2

According to some authorities, Gapon's total role and
complete involvement in the Bloody Sunday affair is still not
accepted as clearly explained.

In spite of the literature about

Gapon, some researchers would say that Gapon did work for the
1 police trying to counteract revolutionary influences among the
workmen.

3

Whatever the truth of the matter,

it cannot be denied

that Gapon played an enormously important role in the Revolution of
1905 in Russia.
men.

He was very successful in dealing with the work

Though his ambition and self-confidence led him on irregular

paths and though his actions sometimes seemed ambiguous, there is
1

Catherine Breshovsky, "Who Is Father Gapon?" Outlook
February
1905, p. 269.
^Poole, "Father Gapon," Outlook, March, 1905» P* 685.
3
Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1931), p. 1172.

no reliable evidence to prove him dishonest or disloyal to his
ideals.

"He was a man deeply interested in the conditions of

labor, sympathetically affected by the injustices he saw, and
1
sincerely dedicated to their correction."
Gapon obviously played
a great part in the drama of January 22, 1905 acted out in
St. Petersburg, Russia.
After January 22, 1905. Gapon issued a denunciation of the
Czar, the bureaucracy and the army.

He published his autobiography

which defended his actions as being sincere in his attempt to help
improve the conditions of the workmen.
chuiich1in March, 1905.

He was unfrocked by the

When he fled from Russia, he joined the

L I
Socialist
Revolutionary Party.

After he had returned to Russia,

Gapon lias forced once again to flee —

this time to Finland.

In

March of 1906, Gapon was hanged by order of P. Eutenberg of the
Socialist Revolutionary Party because the revolutionaries believed
that he had collaborated with the police In 1905*

Thus ended the

controversial career of the main actor in the first act of the
i
Russian Revolution.

;i
! Harcave, First Blood, o. 66.
i
................ ... ..

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN REACTION
The American reaction to Bloody Sunday differed according
to thelvarious sectors of its society. The official United States
i
reaction was slight; it can be assumed that the reason lay in the
fact; that President Theodore Roosevelt was deeply involved in

i

;

tryipg ito negotiate a peace agreement between Russia and Japan.

v i

Theodore Roosevelt had become President upon the death of
i

!

■

■

■

■

'

*

■

William; McKinley in 1901. According to Foster Dulles, he had
r
1
scorn for Russia. President Roosevelt was angry because he felt
that the.Russian diplomats had lied to him while organizing China
against American interests.

Secretary of State John Hay distrusted

the Russians also.

1903 President Roosevelt wrote to

In July,

\

Secretary Hay that:

"I have not the slightest objection to the

Russians knowing that I feel thoroughly aroused and irritated at
their conduct in Manchuria;. . . ."

1

Roosevelt believed Russia's internal affairs were crucial
to her future power.

He was well-informed about Russia's internal

problems:
. . the weakness of her government, the distress of her
people, the revolutionary forces at work there.
Spring Rice
wrote . . . long, often indiscreet letters from the British
j^Foster Rhea Dulles. The Road to Teheran (Princeton:
Press), p. 86.

3^

Yale
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Embassy in St. Petersburg; and. later his own ambassador
George Meyer in European Russia and a young State Department
official, Williard Straight, in Asiatic Russia kept the
President informed.
. • 1There is much about the Russians
which I admire,* he (Roosevel© wrote a year before the
revolution of 1905, 'and I believe in the future of the Slavs
if they can only take the right turn. But I do not believe
in the future of any race while it is under a crushing
. despotism. . . .
Roosevelt exerted great influence on the U.S. governmental
view of Russia and its affairs with that country.

As one historian

summarizes;
With Theodore Roosevelt's reelection in November 1904, and
the steady decline in health and finally the death of John Hay
in July 1905f the President became not only his own secretary
of state for foreign affairs, but "his own cabinet," if not
in fact the Government of the United States personified.
Dennett states that Congress had no part in government, that
senators were seldom consulted, and that the Cabinet made
few contributions.2
In 1898-1899 Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice that the
Russians were a serious problem.

"'.

. . if not for our generation,

at least to the generations which will succeed us.

I look upon

them as a people to whom we can give points, and a beating; a
people with a great future as we have; but a people with poisons
3
working in it. , . .
By 1904 Russian interests were challenging
United States interests in the Far East.

In February of 1904,

Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice that he had "'. . • a strong liking
Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and, the Rise of America
to World Power (New Xorki
Collier Books, 1968), p. 232.
(Here inafter referred to as T.R. and Rise of America.)
E.H. Zabriskie, American Russian Rivalry in the Far East,
1895-1914 (Philadelphia* University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946),
p. 110.
(Hereinafter referred to as American Rivalry Far East.)

3

Beale, T.R. and Rise of America, p. 231.
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and respect for the Russians, but unless they change in some marked
way they contain the chance of menace to the higher life of the
i

world.

Our people have become suspicious of Russia and I personally

share this view.'"^

Though Roosevelt felt antagonism toward Russia,

circumstances were driving the United States to support them as the
aggressive power of Japan was recognized.
In 1905» Roosevelt became increasingly irritated with Russia
because they had sent him a letter of protest, charging China and
Japan with neutrality violations.

China, the letter claimed, had

permitted Japan to use a part of the Liaotung Peninsula as a naval
base and had furnished Japan with cast iron.

Russia, therefore,

\

claimed that she would be obliged to consider the neutrality of
China from the standpoint of her own interests.

Roosevelt wrote

to Secretary Hay that:
It seems to me that if you present Rusia's protest about
breach of neutrality to China, we would at the same time make
a strong protest against Russia herself violating China*s
neutrality, as reported in this morning's papers.
I think
we should seize the opportunity when the wolf invites outside
interference against the lamb to call the wolf's attention
sharply to his own misdeeds.
It may possibly have a healthy
affect in restraining him from a course of conduct that will
cause us trouble hereafter.^
John Hay, however, sent a letter simply expressing the hope
that neither belligerant would breach neutrality.
When the letters of Theodore Roosevelt from 1903-1905 are
examined, It is found that he does not mention the Bloody Sunday

^Beale, T.R. and Rise of America, p. 231.
^Etting E. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1961), pT 1102. A letter of January 16, 1905
to John Jay.
(Hereinafter referred to as Letters of T.R.)
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massacre of January 22, 1905*

Rather, he was very busy distrust

ing the Japanese and the Russians while trying at the same time to
settle their dispute.
he wrote:

Holding no respect for the Russian Czar,

"Personally, I greatly admire the Russian people; but

I think the Russian government represents all that is worst, most
insincere and unscrupulous, and most reactionary.

. .

One reads in his letters that Theodore Roosevelt was concerned
about the Russian loss of Port Arthur to the Japanese.

Since

this military incident took place prior to Bloody Sunday perhaps
it took precedence over any domestic unrest in Russia,

The naval

defeat seems merely to have made Roosevelt aware of the United States
i
.
1
need for a more competent navy.
IThough Roosevelt does not write directly of the Bloody*

Sunday,

it might be assumed that such unspeakable actions on the part of
i
the Russian autocracy did not pass unnoticed. Writing to George
Otto Trevelyan on March 9, 1905, Roosevelt stated:i

Meanwhile, when I realize most keenly the difficulties
inherent under a free representative government in dealing
with foreign questions, it is rather a comfort to feel that
Russia, where freedom has been completely sacrificed, where
the darkest and most reactionary tyranny reigns, has as yet
been unable to do well in the exercise of these functions. . . .2
Roosevelt's disgust over Nicholas's tyranny seems to have given him
reluctance to settle the Russo/Japanese problem as he says:

"I

wish the Japanese and Russians could settle it (the war) between
themselves, and I should be delighted to have anyone except myself

orison, Letters of T . R . , p. 1115.
to George Von Lengerke Meyer.
^Ibid., p. 1132.
Trevelyan.

A letter of February 6, 1905

A letter of March 9, 1905 to Goerge Otto
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give them a jog to settle it."!

Later he expressed to John Jay

his growing contempt for Czar Nicholas?
Did you ever know anything more pitable than the condition
‘ of the Russian despotism in this year of disgrace? The
Czar is a prepostrous C g i Q little creature as the absolute
autocrat of 150,000,000 people.
He has been unable to make
war and now he is unable to make peace.2
Roosevelt finally seems utterly disgusted with the Russians of
whom he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodges
Of course if the Russians go on as they have gone ever since
I have been President. . . they are hopeless creatures with
whom to deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous;
they have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts
in the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no
knowledge of their own strength or weakness, and they are
helplessly unable to meet e m e r g e n c i e s .3
Whether or not the Russians were helpless to meet emergencies,
the American government did not react officially to the Bloody Sunday
occurrence.

In the Papers Relating to'the Foreign Relations of

the United States for 1905. only one mention o f .the Bloody Sunday
is found.

The American ambassador Robert S. McCormick wrote to

the Secretary of State that the disturbance of the people of
St. Petersbug was meant to be peaceful.
The ambassador does not know whatt warning was given, but an
eye-witness told him that an order to fire upon the crowd in
the park was given. The crowd was partly composed of women
and children, and he said some 60 persons were killed and
wounded. At other points in the streets leading to the
palace many were cut down by the Cossacks. A large number

^Morison, Letters of T.R., p. 1150,
1905 to John Jay.

A letter of March 30,

2Ibid.. p. 1158.

A letter of April 2, 1905 to John Jay.

3lbid., p. 1125*

A letter of June 5. 1905 to Henry Cabot Lodge.
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is reported killed and wounded in the manufacturing district, _
but there is no reliable information as to the actual numbers.
If anything, the report to the Secretary seemed somewhat slanted
toward the Russian government's side of the issue*
A reliable eyewitness reported to him (JlcCormicQ that officers
appealed to the crowd to disperse, calling attention to the
posters displayed everywhere warning the public to keep off
the streets and that their lives were in danger if they re
mained; no notice seems to have been paid to this warning.
The crowd shoved the officers about and in some instances
attacked them and tore their insignia from their uniforms and
inflicted severe wounds with clubs. Quiet now prevails in
the center of the city, which is cut off from the manufacturing
districts by the t r o o p s . 2
Ambassador McCormick's source seemed to be on the side of the
"establishment" as his information reflected the employers' views.
The report continued*
A large amount of socialistic literature was circulated among
the workingmen, and a petition which was sent to His Majesty
by them was not written by a Russian workingman, but a German
socialist, as a large employer of labor informed him. A deepseated discontent exists among the working class throughout
the large towns, and yesterday's happenings will probably
increase the antigovernment feeling and discontent with the
present unhappy conditions.3
Further developments seemed to convince McCormick that the socialists
were involved in the strikes
There can be no doubt that for some time a socialist group has
been at work among the operatives in St. Petersburg, as well as
other manufacturing towns and cities of Russia.
In spite of
all precautions taken by the censorship great quantities of
1
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
1905 (Washingtons
Government Printing Office, 1906), p. ?62.
(Hereinafter referred to as Papers Foreign Relations of U.S. 1905).
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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socialistic literature have been sent across the border and
widely distributed from St. Petersburg to Odessa in every town
of any manufacturing importance. This has been going on for
some years and the war and its accompanying conditions have
been such as to bring this propaganda to its full fruition.1
0

Research has revealed that McCormick made the only'-direct mention

to the specific day of the Bloody Sunday massacre;
As far as I can hear, the authorities have the situation now
in hand and no more serious outbreaks *are looked for except
in Moscow, where to-day was fixed as a time for demonstrations
similar to those in St. Petersburg on Sunday. . . .
It is exceedingly difficult to obtain any/information on
what is transpiring outside of St. Petersburg, even in its
suburbs, and tnerefore nothing available here upon which
jtoiform an intelligent opinion as to how widespread is the
ifeeling of discontent and unrest and how far-reaching its
consequences may be.^
\ Ilhere does not seem to be any other official United States
I
mention, of Bloody Sunday. The next comment about Russia in the
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905
came on February 17, 1905*

This was a mention of the assassination

of the Grand Duke Sergius.

To this type of incident, the President

couldi react.
Secretary Hay instructed McCormick to convey condolences
■
j
on the Duke's death and the abhorrence of the act felt by the
_

President and the Government of the United States.

Perhaps neither

the United States Government nor its President could afford to
react to the despicable actions of the Russian government on Bloody
Sunday.

How could the United States Government communicate directly

with j;he Russian people to explain to them any shock or horror it

i ■

felt about the actions of its nobility?

On the other hand, neither

•^Papers Foreign Relations of U.S. 1905» p. 763.
2Ibid.

could the government officially chastise the Russian Czar for
unforgiveable behavior.u Because there was really no avenue of
protest open to'the Government, there was no official American
reaction to the Bloody Sunday massacre.
Though the American public could and did react to the massacre,
it reacted less to the Russo/Japanese war than the government had;
The public was only mildly aroused (over the war)*. . . . Editor
ial writers and public speakers warned that the Muscovite
Peril rather than the Yellow Peril was the real menace to
Western Civilization.
But for all these bellicose hints, the
American people did not feel any.vital interests of theirs
were at stake in Manchuria.
They knew too little about it;
it was too far away.
The shock of the massacre of Bloody Sunday, however, did hit the
Americans closer to home.

"'The Bloody Sunday1 produced a tremendous

impression at home and abroad."
*■ Selected American newspapers were found to be full of horri
fied reaction to'the massacre.

For example, the New York Times

magazine of January 23, 1905 asserts:
The sympathy of the middle classes is with the workmen.
Comment on the action of the troops and authorities is very
bitter, and sarcastic remarks are made that officers are
braver against the defenseless public than against the Japanese,
and that "ammunition may be scarce in the Far East, but is too
plent iful here."3
This same issue of the New York Times had front page headlines which

^Dulles, The Road to Teheran, p. 86. The same sentiment is
expressed in Zabriskie's American Rivalry Far East, p. 112.
P
^Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 19315, P» 1172. The same sentiment is expressed
in Thomas A. Bailsy's, America Faces Russia:
Russian-American Relations
from Early Times to Our Day, (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University
Press, 1950), p. 206.
^"Day of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23,
1905, p. 1.

^2

blazed

with indignation:

DAY OF TERROR IN CZAR'S CAPITAL;

TROOPS
t

SLAY WOMEN AND CHILDREN WITH MEN;

WORKMEN FORCE GUARDS TO

FIRE TO STOP THEM* BARRICADE IN THE STREETS.

The Issue was full

of. articles about the massacre claiming that:
day of unspeakable horror in St. Petersburg."

"This has been a
1

A front page

article described in great detail the scene of the incident and
reported in full as much information as was known about the incident
at that time.

The article included an eye-witness report of an

Associated Press correspondent who was at the scene.

He described

a military camp atmosphere; he also discussed.the presentation of
the workmen's plea to the

Czar.

march.

at 1:30 p.m. on January 22, 1905» an order

He explained that

He described the scene of the

had come for the crowd to disperse.
an order was issued to fire.

When no movement was made,

After the smoke raised, the correspondent

saw mangled corpses of persons of all ages and both sexes lying
on the ground.

He described a gory scene:
"Great splashes and
o
streams of blood stained the snow."
The writer continued to

describe the struggle as:
war.

. • •

"A condition almost bordering on civil

Russia will have a constitution or Emperor Nicholas

will lose his head."^
In that same January 23rd issue of the New York Times, the
newspaper reported on a speech by Justice William J. Gaynor of

p. 1 .

^■"Day of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23. 1905

2
Ibid.
3Ibld.. p. 2 .
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the Supreme Court who said that:
i

. . . the Czar was the tool and victim of a corrupt and
avaricious church and aristocracy, and that if the down
trodden people of Russia did not end this rule the combined
civilizations of the world would have to interpose. . . .
Cthe movement is) by far the most important event in the
foreign politics of our time, and deserves every attention
on the part of distant observers.!
Another New York Times article which contained comments
i

from Europe described how " 1. . . the 'Little Father* has become
the murderer of the people and it remains with him to save the
country from disaster.

Even at the eleventh hour he may do so,

but only by recognizing that autocracy has gone

forever."*’ The

New York Times continued to report on the Russian turmoil through
the week.
problem.

It reported the public's eagerness for news of the Russian
Futhermore, it speculated on the character of Father Gapon.

Not much was known about Gapon, but one writer supported the
priest's actionsj

"I have never heard of Father Gapon, but I know

now that he must be God's own man, since he took no weapon and met
the Cossacks with nothing but a cross raised a l o f t . "3
the newspaper was still using headlines such as:
ST. PETERSBURG;

On January 24th,

TROOPS OVERAWE

MOSCOW WORKERS TAKE UP STRIKE; THREAT OF MORE BLOOD

SHED IN ANCIENT CAPITAL; and RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES BEWILDERED BY
SITUATION.^
mWm

|
.

1
"Day
1905* p. 1 .

\

of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23,

2
"Europe Apprehensive of Russian Revolution." New York Times,
January 23, 1905, p. 2 .
3"Who is Father Gapon?" New York Times, January 23, 1905, p. 2.
4
Headlines, New York Times, January 24, 1905, P# 1.

44

In its January 25th issue the New York Times contained five
articles on the Russian situation ranging from a description of the
massacre, to an article which described Father Gapon1s role and
his life.

By January 26 , 27» and 28, the Times was beginning to

report how the news of the massacre had spread over Russia and of
the action that was being taken as a result of it.

It reported

that the Czar promised to help the workmen and that some measure
of self-government might occur as a result of the wide-spread
strike that had been ignited by Bloody Sunday.
Another perodical, a magazine called The Independent, reacted
to the Bloody Sunday by writing that*

"The recent eruptions in

St. Petersburg and other centers of population in Russia and their
repression by methods so ruthless and bloody as to shock the con-,
science of the whole civilized world have focused attention upon
the condition of the workers in Russian cities."

1

The Independent

writers looked upon this incident, as the beginning of a great
social and political upheaval:
The slaughter of unarmed men, women and children by order of
the Czar, for no other crime than that of peaceably assembling
for the purpose of submitting to him a petition, has at last
opened the eyes of the world to the fact that the Russian
Government is an incorrigible Asiatic despotism. . . . It is
universally conceded that without freedom of speech, without
a free/press, without the right of assembly, without the right
of petition, nothing short of a Revolution can rid the
Russian people of brute force, typified by autocracy. . . . It
was not until a few hundred despairing workmen erected barri
cades in the streets of St. Petersburg that the newspaper
1
"Two Russian Workmen's Stories," The Independent, January 30,
1905, P. 244.
K--
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correspondents announced the beginning of the Russian revolu
tion.
The Independent writers expressed the belief that the uprising of
i

.

Bloody Sunday gave impetus to revolutionary propaganda in Russia
as well as casting a fatal blow at the Czar and Czarism.

2

Express

ing the sentiment that the strike might have far-reaching effects
on Russia, the Independent writers wrote that:
The 22nd of January is a day to be infinitely regretted, both
on its own account and for what may follow. . . . the elements
that entered on the stage on the 22nd of January last week
were . . . serious;. . . .
At all events something new has
arisen in the deepest depths'of the Russian nation— -namely,
the formation of a class of w o r k m e n . ^
The World1s Week magazine reacted.to the massacreforcefully.
One of its writers maintained that the Russian industrial class
has been bled mercilessly by the Russian nobility and bureaucracy
causing the peasantry to suffer.
St. Petersburg workers.

He applauded the actions of the

Claiming that the strike was a political

one which must have shocked the Czar, the writer speculated:
Great must have been the surprise of His Majesty's Government
to. find out that Revolutionary Russia is practically the
whole Russia. . . all is quiet in St. Petersburg,but the
massacre will neither be forgotten nor forgiven.
Another periodical called the Atlantic Monthly reported
that:

“A powerful wave of the people's wrath has risen from un-

•i
X"A Plea for Terrorism," ,The Independent. February 16 , 1905,
pp. 3^9-350.
^Anatole Beaulin, "The Situation in Russia," The Independent,
February 23, 1905, p. 406.
^Alfred Rambaud, "What Is Passing in Russia?" The Independent,
March 23, 1905, t>. 293.
^Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Strike in St. Petersburg," World1s
Week. March, 1905, pp. 5977-5981.

fathomable depths of the people's soul and rolled over all Russia.
St. Petersburg-found itself before the horrible alternative of
slaughter or anarchy,”

To the American people the slaughter which

resulted from the strike on January 22, 1905 was Justification for
the Russian people to react angrily.

The American public condemned

the emperor and Russian nobility for allowing such a despicable
act to.happen.

"'All classes condemn the authorities and more

particularly the e m p e r o r r e p o r t e d the United States Consul
in Odessa."^
|

One!of the American periodicals greatly over-stated the
number of dead .occurring as a result of the massacre Cas compared'
I
'
to later figures on record).
In an article of The American Monthly

i of Reviews it was stated that:
Review
■

'

Ajn industrial strike of vast proportions developing into
political riots which held the Russian capital in a state
of seige and resulted in the killing by the military (on
January 22) of 2,100 and the wounding of 5 , 0 0 0 of the
demonstrators who had gathered before the Winter Palace
tip present a petition to the Czar, has almost set the
entire empire ablaze. . . .3
This article, as well as many others, compared the incident to the
French Revolution.

Amother issue of this magazine expressed the

idea that Russia was ripe for change.

"Russia is on the throes

|1Paul Milyoukov, "Present Tendencies of Russian Liberalism,"
Atlantic Monthly, March 1905* P* ^13*
|^Kochan, Russia in R e v .. p. 80.
I3"is it a Revolution?" The American Monthly Review of Reviews,
February 1905» P- 153*

^7

of a great political and social change."*
Newspapers also blazed with reaction to the Bloody Sunday
events.

The Sunday World Herald of Omaha, Nebraska-on

January 22, 1905 made the public aware of the planned strike.
Headlines read:

RUSSIAN RULER MAX BE FACING A REVOLUTION:

WORKMEN

ARE PREPARING FOR A GREAT DEMONSTRATION AT THE WINTER PALACE THIS
AFTERNOON? WARNED TO STAX AWAY, BUT SAY THEY HAVE NO FEARS, AS
SOLDIERS SYMPATHIZE WITH THEM.

After the massacre, the morning

World Herald of Omaha, Nebraska devoted the entire front page of
its newspaper to reporting Bloody Sunday.

:>Its headlines read:

BLOOD FLOWS IN THE STREET; SUMMARY OF ST. PETERSBURG CRISIS; BOUND
TO AVENGE THOSE WHO FELL; and FATHER GAPON LEADS THE HOST. On the
24th the same periodical headlines:

ST. PETERSBURG IN A STATE OF

SIEGE. 'It included a political cartoon which cried out against
the despotism of the Russian Czar.

As the week went by, however,

the newspaper turned to more exciting news of the war.^
Only one of the magazines-and newspapers examined by this
waiter was at all favorable to the Russian Czar.

The Nation

defended the Russian government’s actions as necessary under the
international conditions which Russia faced at that time:
A government at war, with every energy strained to maintain
its armaments and its military activity at a distance of a
thousand miles, cannot be expected to take chances with
the mob at the very seat of authority and depot of munitions.

*E.J. Dillon, "Dawn of a New Era in Russia," The American
Monthly Review of Reviews. January 1905, p. 34.
^Headlines of Omaha World Herald. January 23» 1905» P» !•

kQ

St. Petersburg. . '. . , has not yet been declared in a state of
siege, but the policing of the city was inevitably military
rather tham civil the moment the strike reduced the population
to idleness and furnished the tinder for a revolutionary
conflagration,
would any other government have acted different1 ly in similar circumstances?1
Whether this question had any validity or not, it was over-looked
in the heat of the emotional times of 1905 and the popular outrage
over the Bloody Sunday.
The magazine called Outlook sent a special reporter to
St. Petersburg just to report on the aftermath of the massacre.
E. J. Poole sailed for Russia on January 28th to report first hand.
At first he wrote anonymous articles for fear that he would be
deported from Russia; later he identified himself.

Poole expressed

quite clearly what appeared to be the feelings of many Americans.
He talked about the "iron hand" which held the Russian people under
an iron rule but expressed the belief that:

. . a people cannot

i

be killed, though their liberties may be suppressed; nor can the
development of a race be permanently arrested...

. ."2

Poole

wrote that:
The autocracy in Russia has shown. . . blindness, and the
Czar showed it on Sunday morning of last week-when the great
opportunity of his life came, and neither he nor apparently
anyone around him saw it-. On that day the tragedy of the
Romanoff dynasty began; for then and there the Czar threw away
the enormous capital of affection and trust which had slowly

1hIrrepressible Reform in Russia," Nation. January 26, 1905.
p. 6l.
*E. j, Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet,” Outlook^ March 18, 1905.
pp. 681-689.
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gathered around the throne for many generations— and had become
a possession unalienable by its own folly. . . .
He has shown
himself utterly unable to understand his own people, and when
the great critical moment, big wit'h fate, came, he closed the
1 door in its face, met the cry of his people, out of their
hearts by a volley of rifle shot. . . . There has been no
more dramatic moment in modern history. . . .
Poole continued to send back reports of the continued Russian furor
which the Bloody Sunday incident started.

He described the gloomy

silence in St. Petersburg caused by the matrial rule prevalent in
the city.

People were quiet because there were soldiers every

where; also thousands-.:more could easily be summoned by telephone.
Modern weapons (gatling guns) could be brought into use.

The work

men were silent— St. Petersburg was quiet— deadly quiet.

Poole

talked to some persons to get their reactions.

He found that the

Russian workmen had lost any small trust they had had in the bureauocrats.

Feeling that they were being spied upon and lied about, the

people explained that the rulers were totally ridiculous.
exclaimed:

They

"It is pitiable to see rulers so ignorant that after

Sunday's struggle they say this was caused by Japanese and English
p
who bribed the workmen to strike against their kind father."
As
a result of his interviews and observations, Poole concluded that
there was evidence to prove to him that the worker's demands were
completely legitimate.

He believed that the strikers had struck

to raise the wages and conditions of the great mass of unskilled*
laborers and skilled women who were grossly underpaid.

He felt

^E. J. Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet," Outlook, March 18,
1905i pp. 681-689.

2Ibld., p. 288.
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some people had joined the strike as a protest for self-government.
Poole definitely sympathized with the strike and expressed the
belief that the Czar had made a grave mistake in the course of
action he sanctioned to squelch the strike.
The writers of the Outlook also furthered the idea that
Bloody Sunday was the beginning of a revolution in Russia.
describing the massacre they wrote:

In

"In that terrible moment the

people saw that there was no 'little father,' only an autocrat;
and for the first time was heard in Russia the ominous cry,
with the Czar!'. . . a revolution has b e g u n . O n e

'Down

Outlook writer

expressed the belief that the turmoil would not soon end:
But that it will be possible eventually to repress this rev
olution we do not for a moment believe * ,. .' The matyred
workingmen of St. Petersburg have died for liberty, and
martyrs do not die in vain,. . . . As we look across the sea
to that host of ignorant, bewildered, oppressed, superstitious
workingmen, led by the priest in his golden vestments, holding
aloft the cross, the rattle of musketry and the shrieks and
groans of the wounded die away, and we hear only the silent
song of their hearts. . . .2
The writers of thfe- Outlook felt that a ". . . duel.
(was} being fought between the Czar and the Russian
it can have but one end.

. .

people, and

. . the Old Russia has passed away as

completely as the France of the Old regime has gone."*^

Outlook

writers believed that only a written constitution.for Russia could
i

save Russia from Revolution.

They expressed a negative view of
l

^■E. J. Poole, "A New Russia," Outlook, February 25# 1905#
p. 263.
^E. J. Poole, "Is it a Revolution?" Outlook, January 28, 1905#
p. 217.
.3poole, "A New Russia," p. 472.
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the Czar, calling him a weak, false, and cruel ruler.

1

The American public which reviewed the magazine and news
paper articles during and after the Bloody Sunday event was swayed
and influenced by the reports they read.

It can be seen that the

American public, as interpreted by the news media of the time,
did react to the Bloody Sunday massacre.

"Editorial writers in

the United States continued to extend warm sympathy to the Russian
’

o

people in their struggle for a free government,.

. . ."7

In Russia the Bloody Sunday revolution is said to have been
the impetus for the long time of struggle which eventually resulted
in thb Russian Revolution of 191?•

Immediately following the

massacre, tens of thousands of revolutionary pamphlets were widely
spread and read.
Strikes spread to other major cities. For most
|
of th^ two years following the incident the Czar was not safe among
his people.

In 1906, he still did not dare venture out of his

imperial yacht and cruised aimlessly off the coast of Russia.

"In

i

the immediate sense Gapon's demonstration failed.
Sunday, Russia was never the same again.

Yet after Bloody

The massacre of an

unarmed, hymn-singing crowd undermined the standing of an autocracy
to an incalculable degree, not only in Russia but also abroad."-^
The Russia of the Middle Ages had turned into a revolutionary Russia.
The events of January 1905 furthered revolutionary ideas among
i

the Russians.

The demand for revolutionary literature grew and

^''Russia Needs a Constitution," Outlook, February 25» 1905» p* 695*
p
;Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia;
Russian American
Relations from Early Times" to Our Pay (ithaca, New Yorki
Cornell
University Press, 1950), p. 207.
-ICochan, Russia in R e v ., pp. 80-81.
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as social democracy sent down deep roots, the revolutionary move
ment gripped wider circles,
Japanese war had begun.

“Bloody Sunday completed what the

. . the major sequel to Bloody Sunday

Qras) the political activization of the masses.

The massacre,

sup'erimposed on the ferment already provoked by the war, made
political concern a mass phenomenon in Russian society.
There were some attempts of reform made as a result of
Bloody Sunday.

Before the Russo-Japanese war, the question of

universal education had been advanced.

But it was not until the

revolutionary outburst of 1905-1906 that the question was seriously
taken up by the Government; then some progress was made toward
improvement in education.

Also, it was not until after the revo

lutionary outbursts and agrarian riots of 1905-1906 that the
Russian government started any definite policy for the improvement
of peasant land tenure and farming.

2

The efforts were not always

concerted, however, as is evident by the eventual revolution and
disagreements which erupted twelve years after the incident in
January 1905*
The revolution of 1905*• • •» had not taken place until the
end of the Russo-Japanese War. Then, the danger from outside
having passed, all varities of revolutionaries were free to
put forward their own far-reaching and conflicting programs,
with the result that the forces of progress dissipated their
strength in conflicts among themselves.3
1-Florinsky, End Russian Empire, pp. 12-13*
2Ibld.. p. 182.
3

Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian
Revolution, (New York and Londont
Columbia University Press, 1962),
p. 19*
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Though there was some disagreement among those advising
reform, positive action was taken in answer to the obvious need for
change.

The actions taken in January 1905 against the people did

encourage a rapid growth of the liberal following in Russia.

It

was -this common point of agreement, extending both to the right of
the Liberationists and to their left that, at this time, led workers
increasingly to support the Liberatlonlst call for a constituent
assembly.

Divisions continued to exist, but Russians in greater

numbers than ever before were working in a common struggle:
'Liberty and representative government* was their unifying
slogan, the Marseillaise their marching song. By the end of
-January, even the doggedly monarchist and conservative
Novoe Vremya was impelled to call for a semsky sobor (an
elected assembly).1
The American public welcomed the thought of a Duma for'the
Russian people.

They were greatly encouraged by the thought that

such a step was a forecast for the future improvement of life in
Russia:
• . ., I believe, the coming imperial Duma is about to give
free scope for the first time in Russian history. . . . But
it really is a beginning,. . . . The Duma once in working
order, everything else is sure to follow, and it is upon
that conviction that I base my forecast that the new era of
internal development which has been inaugurated simultaneously
with the Peace of Portsmouth will bring forth changes more
beneficent and more marvelous than the most sanguine among
us venture to anticipate.2
Both the American hopefuls and Russian reformers were
disappointed in subsequent events in Russia.

Power still remained

In the hands of the Czar and what he decided depended on his
^Harcave, First Blood, pp. 116-117.

2

E.J. Poole, "A Duma for Russia,*' Outlook, September 30, 1905,
pp. 267-271.
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interpretation of the causes and consequences of Bloody Sunday
and his judgment of the relative importance of the various steps
to, be taken in the readjustment period.

He continued to give

priority to the reestablishment and preservation of order? he
insisted on absolute power*
It might have occurred to some rulers, in a situation of
this kind, that the most direct method of restoring order
could be determined by giving immediate attention to some of
the current demands of his people. But Russian Tsars were no
more accustomed to recognizing impertinent demands for
reform than to negotiating with strikers. . ... . Nicholas
himself, less than a month before Bloody Sunday, had in
structed his subjects. . . to mind their own affairs.1
Nicholas believed that the disorders had been provoked by liberals
and decided that he must reassert his control with firmness so that
the revolutionaries would be warned off.

"His understanding of the

revolutionaries was as fuzzy and distorted as was the oppositions
understanding of what went on in his mind.”

2

He began his regime

of firmness the day after Bloody Sunday by demanding that order be
restored using any measures necessary.

Within a few days there

was no question that the steps taken had been effective and the
government was in physical control of the city once again.
Though the insurrection was quieted temporarily in St. Petersburg,
the turmoil it had started had only begun.

Bloody Sunday was only

the first scene in the long drama which was to climax with the
Russian Revolution of 1917.
1
Harcave, Pirst Blood, p. 118.

2ib ia .
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CONCLUSION
The Bloody Sunday Massacre of January 22, 1905 has been
shown to be a relatively small labor strike which spread across
Russia and became the "Revolution of 1905*"

The turmoil of this

year foreshadowed the coming tempetuous revolution which resulted
in the final overthrow of the Russian autocracy.
Close analysis of the events which led up to the labor
march and eventual slaughter, demonstrate the historical coincidence
of certain men.being the "man of the moment"; of one man being in
the right place at the propitious time with ideas appropriate to
the needs of the moment or movement.

Father George- Gapon was the

"man of the moment" in the historical drama of Bloody Sunday.

The

Russian police allowed him to start his labor group, the workmen
trusted him and followed his guidance.

That his lead turned out

to be personal disaster for many of them is historical record.
However, there can be no doubt that Gapon was instrumental in help
ing to arouse the Russian laborer of the early 1900's and encourage
him to look for ways to express his outrage and futility over his
-deplorable working conditions.

There can also be no doubt that

It was Russia's loss that the ruling class of Russia refused to
listen to workmen's and peasants' cries of futility and frustration.
The Bloody Sunday protest turned into a dramatic focus on the plight
of the common man of 1905 in Russia.
The United States government did not officially react to
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the Bloody Sunday slaughter.

The present writer has given a possible

explanation that due to the illness of Secretary of State Hay,
President Theodore Roosevelt acted as his own Secretary of State
in most instances.

At the time of January 22, 1905» Roosevelt was

deeply involved in trying to arbitrate a settlement of the RussoJapanese War.

Developments of an international nature evidently

caused; Roosevelt to be distracted from any Internal domestic affairs
of Russia at that time.

Thus, no direct mention is made of Roosevelt'is

reacjtion to the massacre in any of his letters written during the
1 |
time| period of the incident.
Since Roosevelt expressed great disi j
dain! and distrust of the Russian autocracy, it might be concluded
i•
that|Roosevelt would have been personally shocked at such wanton
j

"blc^d-letting8' of innocent citizens. However, as President of
I '
' '
the United States, there was no way in which Roosevelt could express
any reaction he might have felt.

Similarily, there was no media

through which the United States government could officially react
i

to Bloody Sunday.

Since it was an internal affair, no other govern

ment had any right to criticize the ruling class for the way in
which it handled its domestic problems.

Rather, since the

United. States, embodied in the person of President Roosevelt, was
0

attempting to settle the Russo-Japanese War, there was great cause
and n£ed for much discretion to be taken in regard to any criticism
i

made against either country.

Therefore, the incident is recorded

!

in United States documents, but no official action was taken.
i
jJournalists of the United States did react to the shocking
Bloody Sunday massacre.

The reaction of the newsmen reflected
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the reaction of the American public which must have been swayed by
the reporters' reactions and whose opinions- of the slaughter could
have been influenced by the journalistic conclusions which were
made.

The initial reporting of the incident was typical of any news

reporting of such an emotion-packed incident.
blood -and gore and cruelty of the massacre.

It described the
Naturally the Ameri

can public reacted with disbelief, horror, and great sympathy toward
the workers' plight.

The common man of the United States identi

fied with the underpaid, overworked, and reportedly mal-treated
laborer of Russia.

Outraged American families abhorred the thought

of defenseless women and children being shot down with little
warning.
Most Americans saw the Bloody Sunday aftermath as a signal
for a revolution which would inevitably result from the breaking
of faith such as the Russian ruling class demonstrated during
the strike and after the Duma was created as a result of the
strike.

Independent-minded Americans could understand the laborers'

protests and empathize with them.

The United States citizen of

1905 could not forgive a government which would so totally ignore
or squelch such a protest by using bullets and sabres as its
silencers.

Such a despotic government deserved to be overthrown

by a popular revolution.
It has been shown that the American public did react to the
Bloody Sunday massacre— not through any official channels or
government

pronouncements.

They reacted with disbelieving horror

as voiced through the magazines and newspapers of the time.

The
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American people of 1905 reacted as any people of any time would
react to the mass murder of innocent citizens who were appealing
to a beloved leader; they reacted with an outraged cry against
such a dispicable deed.
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APPENDIX A
PETITION OF WORKERS AND
RESIDENTS OF SAINT PETERSBURG
FOR SUBMISSION TO NICHOLAS II
ON JANUARY 9» 1905

We, workers and residents of the city of St* Petersburg, of
various ranks and stations, our wives, children, and helpless old
parents, have come to Thee, Sire, to seek justice and protection#
We have become beggars* we are oppressed and burdened by labor
beyond: our strength* we are humiliated; we are regarded, not as
human beings, but as slaves who must endure their bitter fate in
silence. We have endured it, and we are being pushed further and
further into the depths of poverty, injustice, and ignorance; we
are being so stifled by despotism and arbitrary rule that we
cannpt breathe.
Sire, we have no more strengthI
Our endurance
is at an end# We have reached that awful moment when death is
preferable to the continuation of intolerable suffering.
; Therefore we stopped work and told our employers that we
would not resume work until they complied with our demands# We
asked for little. We desire only that which is indispensable to
life,! without which there is nothing but slavish labor and end
less ;agony. Our first request was that our employers discuss our
needs with us, but this they refused to do; they denied that we
have a right to speak about our needs, on the grounds that the
law does not recognize such a right.
They also treated as illegal
our other requestsi
to reduce the working day to eight hours,
to
establish wage rates in consultation with us and with our consent,
to investigate our grievances against lower administrative person
nel of the factories, to increase the daily wages for unskilled
working men and women to one ruble, to abolish overtime, to
administer medical aid carefully and politely, to construct work
shops in which it would be possible to work without danger of
death! from miserable drafts, rain, and snow.
i All this seemed illegal to our employers; each of our re
quests was treated as if it were a crime, and our desire to
improve our situation was considered an act of insolance and in
sult •;
Sire, there are many thousands of us here; we have the ap
pearance of human beings but, in fact, neither we nor the rest of
the Russian people enjoy a single human right— not even the right
to speak, think, assemble, discuss our needs, or take steps to
improve our situation.

6o

We have been enslaved, with the help and cooperation of Thy
officials. Any one of us who dares to speak up in defense of the
interests of the working class and the people is jailed or exiledi
it is as if it were a crimeto have a good heart or a sympathetic
soul. Even to feel for one who is beaten, deprived of his rights,
or tortured is a grave crime. The entire people— workers and
peasants— are at the mercy of the bureaucratic administration,
which consists of men who rob the government and the people, men
who.not only ignore, but also acorn, the interests of the people*
Government by bureaucracy has devastated the country, has involv
ed it in a horrible war, and isleading itfurther and further
into ruin.
We, the workers and the people, have no voice at all
in determining how the huge sums extracted from us are spent; we
are denied the means of participating in the levying of taxes or
deciding how they are to be spent. The people have no opportunity
of expressing their desires and demands. The workers are denied
the opportunity to form unions for the defense of their interests.
Sire I Is this in accordance with God’s laws, by the grace
of which Thou reignest? And is it not possible for us to live
under such laws? Is it better to die— for all of us, the toiling
people of all Russia, to die, allowing the capitalists (the ex
ploiters of the working class) and the bureaucrats (who rob the
government and plunder the Russian people) to live and enjoy
themselves? This is the choice we face, Sire, and this is why we
have come to the walls of Thy palace.Here we seek our last/
chance of salvation. Do not deny Thy people help; lead them out
of the depths of injustice, poverty and ignorance; give them the
chance to direct their own fate and rid themselves of the unbear
able bureaucratic yoke. Tear down the wall between Thyself and
Thy people and let them rule together with Thee, Hast Thou not
been placed on the throne for the happiness of the people, and has
not this happiness been denied to us by the bureaucrats, leaving
us only unhappiness and humiliation? Examine our requests dis
passionately and carefully; they are not evil in design, but are
meant to help both us and Thee. We do not speak from insolence,
but from a realization of the need to find a way out of the un
bearable situation in which we find ourselves. Russia is too
great, its needs too varied and profuse, to be governed by the
bureaucrats alone. Popular representation is essental. The
people must help themselves and govern themselves. It is only
they who know their true needs. Do not refuse their help; accept
it; and immediately order the summoning of representatives of the
Russian land from all classes and all strata, including represen
tatives of the workers. Capitalists, workers, bureaucrats,
priests, doctors, and teachers— let them all, whoever they may be,
choose their own representatives. Let all have a free and equal
vote; and toward this end, order the election of a constituent
assembly on the basis of universal, secret, and equal suffrage.
This is our chief request; in it and on it all else is based;
this is the chief and only means of healing our painful wounds;
without it, our wounds will fester and bring us to our death.
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But one measure alone cannot heal our wounds. Additional
ones are indispensable#~ Directly and frankly as to a father, Sire,
we tell Thee, in the name of all of the laboring class of Russia,
what they are.*:
Indispensable arei
I. measures to eliminate the ignorance and disabilities of
the Russian people
1) the immediate release and return of all those who have
suffered for their political and religious convictions,
for strikes, and for peasant disorders
2) the immediate declaration of freedom and inviolability
of person, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
assembly, and freedom of conscience with respect to
religion
3) universal and compulsory popular (primary) education
at the expense of the state
4) responsibility of the ministers to the people and the
guarantee of legality in administration
5) equality of all, without exception, before the law
6) separation of church and state
II#
measures to eliminatethe poverty of the people
1)
abolition of
indirect taxes and their
replacement by
direct, progressive income taxes
2) abolition of redemption dues, (establishment of) cheap
credit, and gradual transfer of land to the people
3) placement of orders for the Navy in Russia, not abroad
4)termination of the war
in accord with popular demand
III#
measures to eliminate the tyranny of capital over
labor
1) abolition of the system of factory inspectors
2) establishment in the factories and mills of permanent
committees elected by the workers, which, together
with the administration, will examine all claims of
individual workers; no worker to be discharged except
by decision of this committee.
3) freedom to establish consumers* and producers*
(cooperatives) and trade unions— -as of now
4) the eight-hour working day and regulation of overtime
5) freedom of labor to struggle against capital— as of now
6) wage regulation— as of now
7) participation of working class representatives in the
preparation of a bill for government insurance of
workers— as of now.
These, Sire, are our chief needs, concerning which we have
come to Thee, The liberation of our motherland from slavery and
poverty is possible only through the satisfaction of these needs;
only thus can she flourish; only thus will it be possible for
workers to organize in protection of their interests against high
handed exploitation by the capitalists and the plundering and
oppressive governmental bureaucrats. Order these measures and
take Thine oath to carry them out. Thou wilt thus make Russia
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both happy and famous, and Thy name will be engraved in our
hearts and in those of our posterity forever# And if Thou dost
not so order and dost not respond to our pleas, we will die here
in this square before Thy palace# We have nowhere else to go and
no purpose in going# We have only two roadsi one leading to
freedom and happiness, the other to the grave. • • • Let our lives
be a sacrifice for suffering Russia# We offer this sacrifice,
not grudgingly, but gladly.*
George Gapon, priest
Ivan Vasimov, worker

1

Harcave, First Blood# p. 285-289#
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APPENDIX C
GAPON*S DESCRIPTION OP THE
BLOODY SUNDAY MASSACRE
"Shall we go straight toward the gate, or by a roundabout
route to avoid the soldiers?1' I was asked#
I shouted huskily,
"No? straight through them# Courage!
Death or Freedom!" and the
crowd shouted in return, "Hurrah!" We then started forward, sing
ing in one mightyv solemn voice the Tsar’s hymn, "God Save thy
People#" But when we came to the line, "Save Nicholas Alexandrovitch," some of the men who belonged to the Socialist party
were wicked enough to substitute the words, "Save George Appolonovitch," while others simply repeated the words, "Death or
Freedom!" The procession moved in a compact mass.
In front of me
were my two body-guards and a young fellow with dark eyes from
whose face his hard labouring life had not yet wiped away the
light of youthful gaiety.
On the flanks of the crowd ran the
children#
Some of the women insisted on walking in the first
rows, in order, as they said, to protect me with their bodies, and
force had to be used to remove them# I may mention also as a sig
nificant fact that at the start the police not only did not inter
fere with the procession, but moved with us with bared heads in
recognition of the religious emblems.
Two local police-officers
marched bareheaded in front of us, preventing any hindrance to
our advance, and forcing a few carriages that we met to turn aside
in our favour#
In this way we approached the Narva Gate, the
crowd becoming denser as we progressed, the singing more impressive,
and the whole scene more dramatic.
At last we reached within two hundred paces of where the
troops stood#
Files of infantry barred the road, and in front of
them a company of cavalry was drawn up, with their swords shining
in the sun. Would they dare to touch us? For a moment we trem
bled, and then started forward again.
Suddenly the company of Cossacks galloped rapidly towards us
with drawn swords.
So, then, it was to be a massacre after all!
There was no time for consideration, for making plans, or giving
orders. //A cry of alarm arose as the Cossacks came down upon us.
Our front ranks broke before them, opening to right and left, and
down this lane the soldiers drove their horses, striking on both
sides. 1(1 saw the swords lifted and falling, the.men, women, and
children dropping to the earth like logs of wood, while moans,
curses, and shouts filled the air.H It was impossible to reason in
the fever of this crisis. At my order' the front rows formed again
in the wake of the Cossacks, who penetrated farther and farther,
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and at last emerged from the end of the procession*
Again we started forward» with solemn resolution and rising
rage in our hearts.
The Cossacks turned their horses, and began
to cut their way through the crowd from the rear.
They passed
through the whole column and galloped back towards the Narva Gate,
where— the infantry having opened their ranks and let them through—
they again formed line. We were still advancing, though the
bayonets raised in threatening rows seemed to point symbolically
to our fate. A spasm of pity filled my heart, but I felt no fear.
Before we started, my dear friend* the workman K
, had said
to me, “We are going to give your life as a sacrifice,” So be itl
"We were not more than thirty yards from the soldiers, being s
separated from them only by the bridge over the Tarakanovsky
Canal, which here marks the border of the city, when suddenly, with
out any warning and without a moment's delay, was heard the dry
crack of many rifle-shots.
I was informed later on that a bugle^
was blown, but we could not hear it above the singing, and even if
we had heard it we should not have known what it meant.
Vassilieff, with whom I was walking<hand in hand, suddenly
left hold of my arm and sank upon the snow.
One of the workmen
who carried the banners fell also.
Immediatelyone of the two
police-officers to whom I had referred shouted out, “What are you
doing? How dare you fire upon the portrait of the Tsar?** This,
of course, had no effect, and both he and the other officer were
shot down— as I learned afterwards, one was killed and the other
dangerously wounded.
- ° I turned rapidly to the crowd and shouted to them to lie down,
and I also stretched myself out upon the ground. As we lay thus
another volley was fired, and another, and yet another, till it
seemed as though the shooting was continuous.
The crowd first
kneeled and then lay flat down, hiding their heads from the rain
of.bullets, while the rear rows of the procession began to run
away.
The smoke of the fire lay before us like a thin cloud, and
I felt it stiflingly in my throat./y An old man named Lavrentieff ,
who was carrying the Tsar's portrait, had been one of the first
victims. Another old man caught the portrait as it fell from his
hands and carried it till he, too, was killed by the next volley.
With his last gasp the old man said, "I may die, but I will see
the Tsar." One of the banner-carriers had his arm broken by a
bullet. /A little boy of ten years, who was carrying a church
lantern, fell pierced by a bullet, but still held the lantern'
tightly and tried to rise again, when another shot struck him down.W
Both the smiths who had guarded me were killed, as well as all
those who were carrying the icons and banners? and all these
emblems now lay scattered on the snow.
The soldiers were actually
shooting into the courtyards of the adjoining houses, where the
crowd tried to find refuge, and, as I learned afterwards, bullets
even struck persons inside, through the windows.
At last the firing ceased.
I stood up with a few others who
remained uninjured and looked down at the bodies that lay pros
trate around me.
I cried to them, "Stand upi" But they lay still.
I could not at first understand. Why did they lie there? I
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looked again, and saw that their arms were stretched out life
lessly, and I saw the scarlet stain of blood upon the snow.
Then I understood*
It was horrible. And my Vassilieff lay
dead at my feet.
Horror crept into my heart.
The thought flashed through my
mind, "And this is the work of our Little Father, the Tsar,"*
a

1

Gapon, Story o f . pp. 180-184.
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